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1613 
WHISTLE WITH A PURPOSE: EXTENDING 
COVERAGE UNDER SOX TO EMPLOYEES 
DISCHARGING THEIR DUTIES  
The relative ease with which corporate fraud went unnoticed during 
the Enron scandal created tension between Congress and the public. In 
hindsight, the public questioned the difference whistleblowers could have 
made if they were adequately protected. Since 2002, the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act (“SOX”) has provided anti-retaliation protection to employees of 
publicly traded companies. However, the language used in the 
whistleblower statute raises the question: Does SOX extend coverage to 
employees discharging their duties? The district courts have thus far 
correctly interpreted SOX as extending coverage to employees 
discharging their duties. Although this issue has only manifested itself in 
the district courts, it is crucial that Congress remain vigilant—foreseeing 
the consequences that would arise if courts start to deny whistleblower 
protection to those best suited to blow the corporate whistle.  
INTRODUCTION 
There are three underlying rationales for protecting whistleblowers.
1
 
First, by protecting employees who report employer wrongdoing, 
whistleblower protection promotes employers’ compliance with the law.2 
Second, by providing whistleblower protection, the government and the 
taxpaying public can expend fewer resources on fixing the problems that 
unreported wrongdoings of government and corporate fraud cause.
3
 Third, 
 
 
 1. Peter D. Banick, Note, The “In-House” Whistleblower: Walking the Line Between “Good 
Cop, Bad Cop,” 37 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1868, 1873 (2011) (defining whistleblowers as 
“employees who, in good faith and with a reasonable belief that their assertions are accurate, report, 
disclose, or otherwise make known . . . any violation of law by their employers . . . for the purpose of 
exposing such wrongdoing”). 
 2. Id. at 1874–75. This protection provides safeguards for those employees who stand in a 
“unique position” to discover and report their employer’s noncompliance or wrongdoing. Id. at 1875; 
Susan J. Spicer, Turning Environmental Litigation on Its E.A.R.: The Effects of Recent State Initiatives 
Encouraging Environmental Audits, 8 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 65 (1997) (addressing compliance as one 
of the goals of whistleblower protection); Julie Jones, Note, Give a Little Whistle: The Need for a 
More Broad Interpretation of the Whistleblower Exception to the Employment-At-Will Doctrine, 34 
TEX. TECH L. REV. 1133, 1147 (2003) (stating that “[w]histleblowers play an important role in law 
enforcement by acting as a means to police employers’ business practices”).  
 3. See Banick, supra note 1, at 1875–76; see also Gerard Sinzdak, An Analysis of Current 
Whistleblower Laws: Defending a More Flexible Approach to Reporting Requirements, 96 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1633, 1636 (2008) (discussing the reduction in enforcement costs to the public due to 
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whistleblower protection is necessary not only to deter employers from 
committing wrongful acts, but also to encourage employees to report these 
wrongful acts.
4
 By providing whistleblower protection, employees can 
freely report their employer’s misdeeds without fear of retaliation.5 
The policy rationales noted above also apply to the whistleblower 
provision of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX”).6 Section 806 of 
SOX provides whistleblower protection to an employee of a publicly 
traded company who reports information regarding violations relating to 
mail fraud, wire fraud, bank fraud, securities fraud, any rule or regulation 
of the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), or any provision of 
federal law relating to fraud against shareholders.
7
 Congress implemented 
the whistleblower provisions of SOX “to help rectify a culture, supported 
by law that discourage[s] employees from reporting fraudulent behavior.”8 
Although some scholars “praise the whistleblower protections of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 as one of the most protective anti-retaliation 
provisions in the world,” many whistleblowers have failed to seek 
protection under SOX.
9
 One reason for this is that, unlike other general 
whistleblower statutes, SOX is tailored to protect only six particular types 
of violations.
10
 Furthermore, the tersely worded and unclear statutory 
 
 
whistleblowers); S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 5 (2002) (noting that the corporate code of silence, if 
overlooked, would create serious and adverse consequences for investors and for the stock market).  
 4. See John A. Gray, Is Whistleblowing Protection Available Under Title IX?: An 
Hermeneutical Divide and the Role of Courts, 12 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 671, 673 (2006) 
(stating that it is unjust to penalize employees who make reports in good faith); see also Nancy M. 
Modesitt, The Garcetti Virus, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 137, 155–56 (2011) (stating that employees should 
not be forced to “choose between losing their jobs and exercising” their right to “protect public money, 
promote safety, . . . [and] encourage compliance with the law”).  
 5. See Banick, supra note 1, at 1876.  
 6. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 806, 116 Stat. 745, 802 (codified at 18 
U.S.C. § 1514A). 
 7. Id.  
 8. Leshinsky v. Telvent GIT, S.A., 942 F. Supp. 2d 432, 440 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (quoting S. REP. 
NO. 107-146, at 4–5 (2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original); see also S. REP. 
NO. 107-146, at 5 (2002) (finding that the corporate code of silence creates “a climate where ongoing 
wrongdoing can occur with virtual impunity”).  
 9. Richard E. Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations: An Empirical Analysis of Why Sarbanes-Oxley 
Whistleblowers Rarely Win, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 65, 65 (2007); see also Norman D. Bishara et 
al., The Mouth of Truth, 10 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 37, 47–49 (2013) (footnotes omitted) (“While hailed as 
an improvement in the evolution of whistleblower laws, in the decades after SOX’s passage as a 
response to corporate scandals, SOX was criticized for not providing enough protection for 
whistleblowers, for its lack of extraterritorial reach, for being obtrusive, and for not playing a role in 
exposing the high-profile frauds that precipitated the financial crisis and recession of 2008.”). 
 10. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 1514A; see also Sarbanes-Oxley, KATZ, MARSHALL & 
BANKS, http://www.kmblegal.com/legal_topics/whistleblower-law/sarbanes-oxley/ (last visited Feb. 5, 
2016), archived at http://perma.cc/4LKH-AQZF. “If an employee complains about violations of state 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss6/9
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language of SOX has led to differing interpretations regarding the scope of 
protection provided to employees.
11
 This has led scholars to question 
whether whistleblower protection extends to employees of private 
contractors
12
 and to employees discharging their duties.
13
 
This Note addresses whether SOX covers employees discharging their 
duties.
14
 Employees are discharging their duties when they act in 
accordance with their job responsibilities and obligations. For example, an 
accountant is discharging his duties when he spots an accounting 
irregularity and reports the irregularity to his supervisor. These types of 
employees are crucial to spotting corporate fraud because of their roles 
and positions within the company.
15
 Without whistleblowing by these 
employees, the public and the government are susceptible to another 
Enron-like debacle.
16
 SOX fails to define the term “employee,” which has 
led to debates about how restrictively the term “employee” should be 
applied.
17
 Clearly delineating the type of employee covered under SOX is 
paramount because employees discharging their duties will not rely on 
SOX if they are not assuaged of their fears of employer retaliation.
18
  
To fully grasp the importance of extending protection under SOX to 
employees discharging their duties, this Note details the chronological 
history of whistleblower protection (i) prior to SOX,
19
 (ii) under SOX, and 
(iii) under the Dodd-Frank Act (“Dodd-Frank”) and Lawson v. FMR LLC. 
Specifically, Part I briefly addresses how Garcetti v. Ceballos
20
 and the 
 
 
regulations, without reference to possible federal law violations, the employee will not be protected by 
SOX.” Id. 
 11. Spinner v. David Landau & Assocs., LLC, ARB Nos. 10-111, 10-115, ALJ No. 2010-SOX-
029, 2012 WL 1999677, at *16 (Dep’t of Labor May 31, 2012). 
 12. See, e.g., Ryan McCarthy, Up in the Air: Lawson v. FMR LLC & the Scope of Sarbanes-
Oxley Whistleblower Protection, 9 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y SIDEBAR 144 (2013).  
 13. See, e.g., Yang v. Navigators Grp., Inc., 18 F. Supp. 3d 519 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
 14. The private contractor issue is discussed in Lawson v. FMR LLC. See infra Part III.D.  
 15. See infra notes 207–11 and accompanying text.  
 16. To perceive the impact that whistleblowers can have on preventing corporate fraud, it is 
important to understand the main catastrophe that gave rise to SOX: Enron. Further, it is crucial to 
understand that history can repeat itself. See S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 11 (2002) (alluding to the real 
possibility that other public companies are engaging in corporate fraud, yet “simply eluding 
discovery”).  
 17. See infra notes 183–86 and accompanying text.  
 18. See MARION G. CRAIN, PAULINE T. KIM & MICHAEL SELMI, WORK LAW: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 505 (3d ed. 2015) (stating that the majority believed that professional obligations by 
accountants and lawyers to blow the whistle without any protection would be insufficient incentives to 
do so). 
 19. Whistleblower protection has evolved from protection under the First Amendment and the 
common law to specific legislative enactment of state and federal whistleblower statutes. CRAIN, KIM 
& SELMI, supra note 18, at 493; see also infra Part I.  
 20. 547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
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Whistleblower Protection Act (“WPA”)21 have declined protection to 
employees discharging their duties.
22
 Part II then introduces the events 
leading up to SOX, analyzes the congressional intent behind the enactment 
of SOX, and discusses why the statute has been ineffective thus far. Part 
III then summarizes how Dodd-Frank amended SOX and discusses 
Lawson v. FMR LLC,
23
 a recent Supreme Court case, as an example of 
how courts have struggled with interpreting the coverage SOX provides to 
different kinds of employees.
24
 Part IV addresses the emerging split at the 
district court level regarding whether employees discharging their duties 
are protected under SOX. Part V analyzes the WPA and considers how 
SOX should be read in light of how the WPA has dealt with employees 
discharging their duties. Finally, Part VI proposes that the recent SDNY 
decision in Yang v. Navigators Group, Inc.,
25
 which extended coverage to 
employees discharging their duties, is the best interpretation of SOX that 
furthers the purpose Congress had in mind when it enacted SOX in 2002.  
I. WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION PRIOR TO SOX 
A. Protected Speech Under the First Amendment and Common Law 
Before statutory protections existed for whistleblowers, employees had 
to rely on either the First Amendment or the common law for protection.
26
 
Under the First Amendment, public employees could allege that their 
speech was protected because they were speaking as citizens on matters of 
public concern.
27
 Under the common law, at-will employees alleged that 
they were wrongfully discharged in violation of a known and accepted 
public policy.
28
  
 
 
 21. Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-12, 103 Stat. 16 (codified at 5 U.S.C. 
§§ 1201–1222). 
 22. For the purposes of this Note, the language “employees discharging their duties” is 
synonymous with “arising out of one’s job duties.” 
 23. 134 S. Ct. 1158 (2014).  
 24. The analysis in Lawson is used as an argument for extending coverage under SOX to 
employees discharging their duties. See infra Part VI. 
 25. Yang v. Navigators Grp., Inc., 18 F. Supp. 3d 519 (S.D.N.Y 2014); see also infra notes 155–
56 and accompanying text.  
 26. See generally CRAIN, KIM & SELMI, supra note 18, at 460 (noting how different types of 
employees sought protection).  
 27. Id. at 460. 
 28. See, e.g., Petermann v. Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and 
Helpers of America, Local 396, 344 P.2d 25, 27 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959). For example, Petermann was 
discharged for refusing to testify falsely before a state legislative committee. In recognizing the 
interests of the state, the court reasoned that “[i]t would be obnoxious . . . to allow an employer to 
discharge any employee . . . on the ground that the employee declined to commit perjury.” Id.; see also 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss6/9
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However, both the First Amendment and the common law are limited 
in providing whistleblower protection. In fact, constitutional protection 
under the First Amendment only applies to public government employees, 
and it is limited to speech that (1) does not arise out of one’s job duties,29 
(2) is truly a matter of public concern,
30
 and (3) outweighs the government 
employer’s interest “in promoting the efficiency of the public services it 
performs through its employees.”31 Similarly, the public policy exception 
does not apply in every state, and even where the exception does exist, it 
must be tied to a public policy that society is willing to recognize.
32
 
Although some whistleblower protection existed under the First 
Amendment and the common law, Congress enacted more concrete 
statutory protection for whistleblowers under the WPA and SOX.
33
  
B. Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989 
The WPA
34
 was enacted in 1989 to protect “employees who disclose 
Government illegality, waste, and corruption.”35 The statute applies to  
any disclosure of information by an employee . . . which the 
employee . . . reasonably believes evidences—(A) a violation of any 
law, rule, or regulation; or (B) gross mismanagement, a gross waste 
 
 
Charles J. Muhl, The Employment-At-Will Doctrine: Three Major Exceptions, MONTHLY LAB. REV., 
Jan. 2001, available at http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2001/01/art1full.pdf.  
 29. See generally Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006) (stating that speech made pursuant to 
one’s job duties is not protected under the First Amendment).  
 30. See generally Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983) (creating a threshold question to 
exclude an employee’s speech that is purely proprietary in nature). 
 31. CRAIN, KIM & SELMI, supra note 18, at 461; see also generally Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 
391 U.S. 563 (1968) (laying out the basic framework for balancing the interest between the citizen 
employee and the government employer).  
 32. See generally Muhl, supra note 28, at 6 (noting how different states define public policy and 
listing the seven states that have outright rejected the public policy exception). Compare Strozinsky v. 
Sch. Dist. of Brown Deer, 614 N.W.2d 443, 445 (Wis. 2000) (quoting Winkelman v. Beloit Memorial 
Hospital, 483 N.W.2d 211 (Wis. 1992)) (considering the “‘spirit as well as the letter’” of the law in 
determining public policy), with Gantt v. Sentry Ins., 824 P.2d 680, 687–88 (Cal. 1992) (allowing for a 
wrongful-discharge tort when the public policy is “carefully tethered to fundamental policies that are 
delineated in constitutional or statutory provisions”).  
 33. See Jones, supra note 2, at 1163 (noting that the passage of SOX is evidence of Congress and 
the public taking whistleblowing more seriously).  
 34. Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-12, 103 Stat. 16 (codified at 5 U.S.C. 
§§ 1201–1222).  
 35. Id. (noting in the “Findings and Purpose” Section how this served the public interest and 
created “a more effective civil service”).  
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of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger 
to public health or safety.
36
  
Despite seemingly clear statutory language
37
 and legislative history,
38
 the 
Federal Circuit interpreted the WPA to exclude employees discharging 
their duties in Willis v. Department of Agriculture
39
 and Huffman v. Office 
of Personnel Management.
40
 
C. Willis v. Department of Agriculture (1998) 
In 1998, a plaintiff-employee sought protection under the WPA after 
reporting that some of the conservation farms he worked for were out of 
compliance with the Department of Agriculture’s approved conservation 
plans.
41
 In denying coverage to the plaintiff-employee, the US Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“Federal Circuit”) stated that the goal of 
the WPA is to “protect government employees who risk their own 
personal job security for the advancement of the public good by disclosing 
abuses by government personnel.”42 Plaintiff-employee’s job 
responsibility was to report when farms were out of compliance. This 
responsibility did not put him at “personal risk for the benefit of the public 
good.”43 Due to these reasons, plaintiff-employee’s claim was dismissed 
for failing to allege any protected disclosure that satisfied the WPA’s 
jurisdictional prerequisites.
44
   
 
 
 36. 5 U.S.C. § 1213(a)(1) (2014) (emphasis added).  
 37. See Modesitt, supra note 4, at 149 (stating that “the plain language is unambiguous and . . . 
supports the interpretation that a disclosure made in the course of one’s normal job duties is 
protected”). 
 38. See Modesitt, supra note 4, at 149 (arguing that the legislative history is also clear because 
Congress amended the language from “a disclosure” to “any disclosure” when it amended the Civil 
Service Act of 1978). 
 39. 141 F.3d 1139 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 40. 263 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2001); see also infra notes 41–50 and accompanying text.  
 41. Willis, 141 F.3d at 1139. 
 42. Id. at 1444 (finding that extending coverage to an employee in this situation would broaden 
protection to nearly every report dealing with a possible breach of a law or regulation).  
 43. Id.; see also Langer v. Dep’t of the Treasury, 265 F.3d 1259, 1267 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Herman 
v. Dep’t of Justice, 193 F.3d 1375, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[T]he WPA was enacted to protect 
employees who report genuine violations of law, not to encourage employees to report minor or 
inadvertent miscues occurring in the conscientious carrying out of a federal official or employee’s 
assigned duties.”).  
 44. Willis, 141 F.3d at 1145.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss6/9
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D. Huffman v. Office of Personnel Management (2001)  
In line with Willis, the Federal Circuit in Huffman v. Office of 
Personnel Management
45
 found that a plaintiff-employee’s complaints to a 
supervisor about the supervisor’s conduct did not constitute a disclosure 
under the WPA.
46
 The court came to this conclusion because the WPA 
defines disclosure as “reveal[ing] something . . . hidden and not known.”47 
Therefore, a plaintiff-employee must go “above and beyond the call of 
duty and report infractions of law that are hidden.”48 This means that a 
plaintiff-employee with investigatory responsibilities must report 
wrongdoing outside of normal channels to constitute a disclosure that 
reveals something unknown to the general public.
49
 In the end, the Federal 
Circuit affirmed the lower court’s finding that plaintiff-employee’s 
complaint to his supervisors did not constitute a protected disclosure.
50
 
E. Garcetti v. Ceballos (2006) 
Although this idea of excluding employees based on their job duties 
stems from common law interpretations of the WPA, it has spread, with 
the help of Garcetti, to other statutes as well.
51
  
In 2006, the Supreme Court held that “when public employees make 
statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking 
as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not 
insulate their communications from employer discipline.”52 In this case, 
Richard Ceballos, a district attorney, claimed that he was “subjected to a 
series of retaliatory employment actions” after he notified his supervisors 
of the misrepresented facts in a search warrant affidavit.
53
 In finding for 
 
 
 45. 263 F.3d 1341. 
 46. Id. at 1344.  
 47. Id. at 1350 (finding it “quite significant that Congress in the WPA did not use a word with a 
broader connotation such as ‘report’ or ‘state’”); see also 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) (2014) (giving further 
guidance by stating that disclosures within normal channels and reports of publicly known information 
do not constitute protected disclosures under the WPA).  
 48. Huffman, 263 F.3d at 1353.  
 49. Id. at 1354. The underlying premise is that the report is something society has to know and 
that the need to know is so great that an employee is willing to risk her job for the betterment of 
society. The court gives an example of a “law enforcement officer who is responsible for investigating 
crime by government employees who, feeling that the normal chain of command is unresponsive, 
reports wrongdoing outside of normal channels.” Id.  
 50. Id. at 1355. 
 51. See Modesitt, supra note 4, at 195 (calling it the “Garcetti Virus” and “analyzing the degree 
to which the job duties exclusion has infected [other] statutes”).  
 52. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006).  
 53. Id. at 415.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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the government employer, Justice Kennedy stated, “Ceballos did not act as 
a citizen when he went about conducting his daily professional activities” 
and “did not speak as a citizen by writing a memo that addressed the 
proper disposition of a pending criminal case.”54 Instead, by discharging 
his duties, he “acted as a government employee” and therefore his speech 
was not protected under the First Amendment.
55
  
Despite the fact that “Garcetti involved a constitutional, [rather than] a 
statutory, claim, the decision has given new life to the doctrine” of 
excluding employees discharging their duties.
56
 The impact Garcetti has is 
evident in the common law interpreting the WPA, and this can be a useful 
starting point in analyzing the protection afforded under SOX to 
employees discharging their duties.
57
  
II. WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION UNDER SOX 
A. The Rise and Fall of Enron  
In 1985, two gas companies merged to form Enron, a Houston-based 
energy-trading corporation.
58
 Within a short span of fifteen years, Enron 
grew to become America’s seventh largest company.59 Enron’s success, 
however, was based on a series of scams and fraudulent accounting 
practices that misstated its income.
60
 In October 2001, investigations 
revealed that Enron had created partnerships with off-the-book entities that 
 
 
 54. Id. at 422. 
 55. Id.  
 56. Modesitt, supra note 4, at 137.  
 57. See infra Part VI.  
 58. Enron Files for Bankruptcy, THE HIST. CHANNEL, http://www.history.com/this-day-in-
history/enron-files-for-bankruptcy (last visited Feb. 5, 2016), archived at https://perma.cc/QJ6N-
SNJR. In 1985, Houston Natural Gas and InterNorth merged under Chairman and CEO Kenneth Lay. 
Id. 
 59. Id. (noting that Enron rose as high as number seven on the Fortune 500 list and employed 
21,000 people with a posted revenue of $111 billion in 2000); see also The 10 Worst Corporate 
Accounting Scandals of All Time, ACCT. DEGREE REV., http://www.accounting-degree.org/scandals/ 
(last visited Jan. 8, 2015), archived at https://perma.cc/T4NT-9Y87 (stating that Enron had been 
named America’s Most Innovative Company each of the six years prior to its scandal).  
 60. See S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 2 (2002) (“[W]ith the approval or advice of its accountants, 
auditors and lawyers, [Enron] used thousands of off-the-book entities to overstate corporate profits, 
understate corporate debts and inflate Enron’s stock price.”); Enron Scandal at-a-Glance, BBC NEWS 
(Aug. 22, 2002, 4:59 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/1780075.stm, archived at https://perm 
a.cc/GQQ6-YPQD (“Enron lied about its profits and stands accused of a range of shady dealings, 
including concealing debts so they didn’t show up in the company’s accounts.”); The Fall of Enron, 
NPR, http://www.npr.org/news/specials/enron/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2016), archived at http://perma 
.cc/Y5MV-6A4R (finding that Enron’s income and equity value was a few billion dollars less than its 
balance sheet reflected). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss6/9
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hid massive amounts of debt from the public.
61
 At its peak, Enron stock 
sold for over $90 per share, but by the time the Enron scandal was 
revealed, the stock dropped to $0.26 as investors and creditors retreated.
62
  
Soon thereafter, Enron filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, which resulted 
in the loss of jobs, pensions, and billions of dollars in stock value.
63
 
Further investigation revealed that “company officials willfully ignored 
internal warnings about the accounting irregularities even as they pocketed 
millions of dollar in stock-market gains.”64 In addition, Arthur Andersen, 
Enron’s auditing company, was found guilty of both perpetrating 
corporate fraud and destroying evidence.
65
 This led to thousands of angry 
investors, employees, and pension holders wondering why no one within 
either Enron or Arthur Andersen reported any of the extensive accounting 
improprieties.
66
 To make matters worse, between 2001 and 2002, 
WorldCom, a major telecommunications company, was also caught 
engaging in corporate malfeasance.
67
  
 
 
 61. Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A Critique of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1, 4 (2002) (“Enron gave the impression of ever-increasing 
earnings and stable finances through extensive derivatives trading and profitable transactions with 
special purpose entities (SPEs), which also yielded substantial gains for Enron insiders.”); S. REP. NO. 
107-146, at 2–3 (2002) (“The partnerships—with names like Jedi, Chewco, Rawhide, Ponderosa and 
Sundance—were used essentially to cook the books and trick both the public and federal regulators 
about how well Enron was doing financially.”).  
 62. Enron Files for Bankruptcy, supra note 58; Enron Scandal at-a-Glance, supra note 60. 
 63. Enron Files for Bankruptcy, supra note 58 (finding that the collapse of Enron led to the loss 
of 5600 jobs and the liquidation of almost $2.1 billion in pension plans); The Fall of Enron, supra note 
60. 
 64. The Fall of Enron, supra note 60; see also Robert H. Tillman & Michael L. Indergaard, 
Pump and Dump, WASH. POST (Feb. 22, 2006, 1:00 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/discussion/2006/02/21/DI2006022100575.html, archived at perma.cc/P9LZ-UYNW 
(noting that Enron officials used a “pump and dump” scheme which “artificially inflated stocks and 
securities in order to [allow Enron officials] to sell their shares at higher prices, leaving any fall-out 
and responsibility on naive investors”). 
 65. See The Fall of Enron, supra note 60 (“Arthur Andersen . . . at best neglected to recognize 
the company’s problems. At worst . . . the auditor was complicit in perpetrating one of the biggest 
frauds in corporate history.”); Ribstein, supra note 61, at 11 (arguing that the problem involves a 
combination “of excessive ties between auditing firms and the companies they are supposed to be 
scrutinizing, [and] inadequate review of the accounting firm’s work by corporate audit committees”); 
see also Enron Files for Bankruptcy, supra note 58 (finding that Arthur Andersen’s auditors were 
guilty of deliberately destroying documents incriminating to Enron); S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 4 (2002) 
(stating that employees were instructed to “work overtime if necessary to accomplish the destruction”). 
 66. See The Fall of Andersen, CHI. TRIB. (Sept. 1, 2002), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ 
chi-0209010315sep01-story.html#page=1 (stating that the 90-year-old auditing firm “shunted aside 
accountants who failed to adapt to the firm’s new direction” by forcing out “roughly one of every 10 
auditing partners and . . . watchdogs” as the firm “embarked on a path that valued hefty fees ahead of 
bluntly honest bookkeeping”); Enron Scandal at-a-Glance, supra note 60 (noting that the Enron 
scandal prompted “the accounting industry to take a hard look at itself”).  
 67. Simon Romero & Riva D. Atlas, WorldCom’s Collapse: The Overview; WorldCom Files for 
Bankruptcy; Largest U.S. Case, N.Y. TIMES (July 22, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/07/22/ 
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“In order to keep [financial] reports in line with Wall Street’s 
expectations,” WorldCom filed reports claiming billions in false profits.68 
In the end, the company filed for bankruptcy and dismissed more than 
20,000 employees.
69
 
B. The Purpose Behind Enacting the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002  
As a result of Enron’s massive corporate scandal, the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002,
70
 also known as the Public Company Accounting Reform and 
Investor Protection Act, was promulgated.
71
 By enacting SOX, Congress 
intended to prevent corporate fraud and create stability in the financial 
markets.
72
 In order to accomplish this goal, SOX seeks to limit 
information asymmetry.
73
 By making financial statements of public 
companies more transparent, SOX hoped to make the information that 
investors receive more accurate and representative of the financial health 
and status of a company.
74
  
 
 
us/worldcom-s-collapse-the-overview-worldcom-files-for-bankruptcy-largest-us-case.html, archived 
at http://perma.cc/5TJ9-7DZ4; The 10 Worst Corporate Accounting Scandals of All Time, supra note 
59 (noting that WorldCom inflated $11 billion in assets, which led to 30,000 lost jobs and a loss of 
$180 billion for investors); see also generally Dick Carozza, Extraordinary Circumstances: An 
Interview with Cynthia Cooper, FRAUD MAG., Mar./Apr. 2008, http://www.fraud-magazine.com/ 
article.aspx?id=210, archived at http://perma.cc/B4FZ-Z6DU (reporting that WorldCom’s stock prices 
fell from $64 to $0.83); David Hancock, World-Class Scandal at WorldCom, CBS NEWS (June 26, 
2002, 9:23 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/world-class-scandal-at-worldcom, archived at 
http://perma.cc/7YU9-VZHS.  
 68. Jennifer S. Recine, Examination of the White Collar Crime Penalty Enhancements in the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1535, 1542–45 (2002).  
 69. Id.; see also Theodore F. di Stefano, WorldCom’s Failure: Why Did It Happen?, E-
COMMERCE TIMES (Aug. 19, 2005, 7:00 AM), http://www.ecommercetimes.com/story/45542.html, 
archived at http://perma.cc/PN7N-AK5Q (internal quotation marks omitted) (noting that “a lack of 
effective checks and balances on the power of senior management” along with a lack of transparency 
gave rise to WorldCom’s massive corporate fraud).  
 70. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002); S. REP. NO. 107-
146, at 2 (2002) (“The [Sarbanes-Oxley Act] was introduced by Senator Patrick Leahy, with Senators 
Daschle, Durbin, and Harkin as original cosponsors, on March 12, 2002.”).  
 71. By a vote of 99-0 in the Senate and 423-3 in the House or Representatives, SOX was passed 
and sent to President George W. Bush, who signed the statute into law on July 30, 2002. JAMES S. 
TURLEY & STEVE HOWE, ERNEST & YOUNG LLP, THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT AT 10: ENHANCING 
THE RELIABILITY OF FINANCIAL REPORTING AND AUDIT QUALITY (2012), archived at 
http://perma.cc/R7Q3-6B9Q.  
 72. Lawson v. FMR LLC, 134 S. Ct. 1158, 1161 (2014) (stating that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was 
passed to “safeguard investors in public companies and restore trust in the financial markets”). 
 73. Clayton Brite, Is Sarbanes-Oxley a Failing Law?, U. CHI. UNDERGRAD. L. REV., June 30, 
2013, at 1–3, archived at http://perma.cc/W8NC-3DWC (defining information asymmetry as “a 
situation in which one party in a transaction has more or superior information compared to another”).  
 74. Id. at 3; see also S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 11 (2002) (stating that the “majority of Americans 
depend on capital markets to invest in the future needs of their families” and that greater accountability 
and transparency would help the financial markets to function properly). 
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Congress included four titles within SOX that helped create this 
transparency.
75
 Title I of SOX established the Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board (“PCAOB”).76 The PCAOB effectively 
ended “over 100 years of self-regulation” and self-auditing by providing 
audit services for public companies.
77
 Title II established auditor 
independence by creating ways to limit conflicts of interest.
78
 Title III 
enhanced transparency and accountability by holding management 
executives fully responsible for the accuracy and completeness of their 
companies’ financial statements.79 Finally, Title IV required internal 
controls for assessing internal disclosures by employees of the public 
company.
80
 These four titles work together to ensure that the public is not 
misled as to the financial status of any publicly traded company.
81
  
Another major component of SOX, Section 806, provides protection to 
non-governmental whistleblowers. Prior to the enactment of SOX, 
whistleblowers of publicly traded companies did not receive any statutory 
protection.
82
 As an example, Sherron Watkins, former Vice-President of 
Enron, received no protection under Texas law
83
 when Enron retaliated 
against her for warning the Chairman of accounting improprieties within 
 
 
 75. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, §§ 101–409, 116 Stat. 745, 750–791 
(2002). For brevity, this Note only mentions the first four of the eleven titles. The main focus is on 
Title VIII and the whistleblower provisions of SOX.  
 76. See id. §§ 101–109 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7211–7219). 
 77. See TURLEY & HOWE, supra note 71, at 1–3. 
 78. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 §§ 201–209. For example, Title II prohibits audit firms from 
providing certain non-audit services to clients and requires audit partners to rotate every five years 
instead of every seven. Id. § 203.  
 79. Id. §§ 301–308; see also TURLEY & HOWE, supra note 71, at 6. 
 80. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 §§ 401–409; see also Shannon Kay Quigley, Whistleblower 
Tug-Of-War: Corporate Attempts to Secure Internal Reporting Procedures in the Face of External 
Monetary Incentives Provided by the Dodd-Frank Act, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 255, 262 (2012) 
(enumerating what SOX demands of corporations); Ribstein, supra note 61, at 11–19. 
 81. By calling for greater accountability, SOX seeks to quell public mistrust in the financial 
markets post-Enron.  
 82. S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 19 (2002) (“[C]urrent law protects many government employees . . . 
[but] there is no similar protection for employees of publicly traded companies who blow the whistle 
on fraud and protect investors. With one in every two Americans investing in public companies, this 
distinction fails to serve the public good.”); see also CRAIN, KIM & SELMI, supra note 18, at 498 
(raising “questions about how such extensive accounting irregularities and outright fraud could go on 
undetected for years” and wondering if whistleblowers “could have stopped or exposed these 
fraudulent practices”); Banick, supra note 1, at 1877 (noting that the Whistleblower Protection Act of 
1989 only provided protection to federal employees). 
 83. See generally Sabine Pilot Serv., Inc. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733, 735 (Tex. 1985) (holding 
that the at-will rule only applied when an employee refused to perform an illegal act that carried 
criminal penalties). 
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the company.
84
 Furthermore, it was found that many of Enron’s employees 
and executives “did not feel secure enough in their jobs to question 
irregularities.”85 As a result, Congress added protection for whistleblowers 
to encourage employees to disclose, in good faith, securities law violations 
by their employers, without fear of retaliation.
86
 
C. Effectiveness of SOX  
The debate over the effectiveness of SOX continues to this day.
87
 
Proponents of SOX, such as President George W. Bush, describe the 
statute as a huge improvement for whistleblower protection,
88
 and “among 
the most far reaching reforms of American business practices since the 
time of Franklin Delano Roosevelt.”89 At the time of SOX’s enactment, 
“the public applauded Congress for their fast action.”90 In hindsight, 
however, this swift reaction by both houses of Congress has been 
described as “a knee-jerk reaction . . . that was perhaps not fully thought 
through.”91 
 
 
 84. See Kathleen F. Brickey, From Enron to WorldCom and Beyond: Life and Crime After 
Sarbanes-Oxley, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 357, 363 (2003) (noting how Sherron Watkins had been 
“reassigned from her executive suite to a starkly furnished office 33 floors below and relegated to 
performing make-work tasks”); Enron Whistleblower Tells of ‘Crooked Company,’ NBC NEWS (Mar. 
15, 2006, 7:46 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/11839694/ns/business-corporate_scandals/t/enron-w 
histleblower-tells-crooked-company/#.Vzjw_pMrIdV, archived at http://perma.cc/Q3S4-N44G; see 
also S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 5 (2002) (listing several examples of Enron employees who were 
retaliated against for either expressing reservations to management, repeatedly warning executives, or 
advising clients to sell Enron stock). 
 85. As Enron Purged Its Ranks, Dissent Was Swept Away, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2002), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/02/04/business/04EXOD.html?pagewanted=all, archived at http://perm 
a.cc/RZ3D-LN52; see also S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 5 (2002) (finding that Enron’s employees who 
attempted to blow the whistle “were discouraged at nearly every turn”); Carozza, supra note 67 
(explaining how Cynthia Cooper faced “a multitude of challenges,” ranging from hostility, 
chastisement, and even to assurances that WorldCom’s allowances were proper).  
 86. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 1514A; see also Moberly, supra note 9, at 74–75 (finding that 
Congress placed an emphasis on breaking the “corporate code of silence” that discouraged 
whistleblowing in the workplace). 
 87. See Brite, supra note 73, at 1 (arguing that SOX has been effective, while others argue that it 
has “stymied companies, slowed economic growth, and inhibited the United States’ emergence from 
this current recession”). 
 88. See S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 6–10 (2002) (listing six shortcomings in the current law that 
Enron exposed).  
 89. Fred W. Alvarez, Elizabeth C. Tippett, Jeanna C. Steele & Michael J. Nader, The Sarbanes-
Oxley Act: Current Issues in Whistleblower Enforcement, SP027 ALI-ABA 233, 238 (2009) (quoting 
President George W. Bush, Remarks by the President on Signing the Sarbanes-Oxley Action of 2002 
(July 30, 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/07/20020730) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 90. See Brite, supra note 73, at 2.  
 91. Id. at 1 (quoting Vanessa Walters, Doing More Harm Than Good, FIN. TIMES (2006)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
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Either way, most employees face a steep “uphill battle” in finding 
protection under SOX.
92
 Within the first three years after it was passed, 
SOX had a success rate of 3.6%.
93
 The success rate can be attributed to 
procedural hurdles such as: (1) requiring employees to exhaust all 
administrative remedies with the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (“OSHA”);94 (2) requiring employees to file a claim within 
ninety days of retaliation; and (3) requiring appeals to be made within 
thirty days of an OSHA decision.
95
 Furthermore, OSHA strictly enforces 
the statute of limitations
96
 on SOX cases, and equitable arguments 
explaining the reason for late filings have generated little success.
97
  
If an employee somehow manages to pass all the procedural hurdles, 
she is still left with proving the substance of the claim.
98
 In order to 
successfully state a claim under § 1514A,
99
 a plaintiff must allege that: 
“(1) she engaged in protected activity; (2) the employer knew that she 
engaged in the protected activity; (3) she suffered an unfavorable 
personnel action; and (4) the protected activity was a contributing factor in 
the unfavorable action.”100 With so many restrictions, SOX has one of the 
lowest employee-win ratios when compared to other whistleblower 
statutes.
101
   
 
 
 92. Moberly, supra note 9, at 131 (footnote omitted) (“An employee who files a Sarbanes-Oxley 
claim faces a steeper uphill battle than most employees asserting claims against an employer under 
comparable employee statutes. Simply put, this study’s results suggest that Sarbanes-Oxley does not 
protect employee whistleblowers to the extent Congress envisioned when it passed the Act.”). 
 93. An employee is successful when she brings a timely claim, meets all the procedural 
requirements, and wins on her whistleblower claim under SOX. See Moberly, supra note 9, at 67 
(finding that “491 employees filed Sarbanes-Oxley complaints with the Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration” and that “OSHA resolved 361 of these cases and found for employees only 13 
times, a win rate of 3.6%”).  
 94. Lucienne M. Hartmann, Whistle While You Work: The Fairytale-Like Whistleblower 
Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act and the Emergence of “Greedy,” the Eighth Dwarf, 62 MERCER L. 
REV. 1279, 1302–03 (2011).  
 95. See Moberly, supra note 9, at 100–03 (showing that 21% of cases failed under a procedural 
rationale).  
 96. S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 12 (2002).  
 97. See Moberly, supra note 9, at 107–08 (requiring that a report correspond to one of the four 
securities frauds listed in the statute). 
 98. See Moberly, supra note 9, at 76. 
 99. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 1514A. 
 100. Harp v. Charter Commc’ns, Inc., 558 F.3d 722, 723 (7th Cir. 2009).  
 101. See Moberly, supra note 9, at 93 tbl. 2.  
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III. WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION UNDER DODD-FRANK & LAWSON V. 
FMR LLC 
A. Financial Crisis of 2008 
SOX has also been criticized for failing to both provide enough 
protection to whistleblowers and prevent the financial crisis of 2008.
102
 In 
September of 2008, Lehman Brothers filed for one of the largest US 
corporate bankruptcies in history.
103
 With Lehman Brothers bankrupt, 
panic ensued, and public distrust of the financial institution led to a freeze 
on lending and spending.
104
 To prevent Merrill Lynch from following a 
similar fate, Bank of America bought Merrill Lynch for $50 billion.
105
 As 
conditions deteriorated, “[m]ajor banks, insurers, government-sponsored 
enterprises, and investment banks either failed or required hundreds of 
billions in federal support to continue functioning.”106 In response, the 
government used taxpayer dollars to bail out banks and the economy was 
left in the worst recession it had seen in eighty years.
107
 This collapse left 
our financial system in disarray and millions of Americans unemployed.
108
  
B. Significant Changes to SOX  
After SOX failed to prevent the financial crisis of 2008,
109
 Congress 
drafted the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
 
 
 102. See Bishara et al., supra note 9, at 39 (footnotes omitted) (criticizing SOX for “its lack of 
extraterritorial reach, for being obtrusive, and for not playing a role in exposing the high-profile frauds 
that precipitated the financial crisis and recession of 2008”).  
 103. James Quinn, Lehman Brothers Files for Bankruptcy as Credit Crisis Bites, THE TELEGRAPH 
(Sept. 15, 2008, 6:40 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/banksandfinance/ 
4676621/Lehman-Brothers-files-for-bankruptcy-as-credit-crisis-bites.html, archived at http://perma.c 
c/9T9X-DSCU. 
 104. See Crash Course: The Origins of the Financial Crisis, THE ECONOMIST (Sept. 7, 2013), 
http://www.economist.com/news/schoolsbrief/21584534-effects-financial-crisis-are-still-being-felt-fiv 
e-years-article, archived at http://perma.cc/UML2-Y9DT. 
 105. Quinn, supra note 103. 
 106. Nicole H. Sprinzen, Asadi v. GE Energy (USA) L.L.C.: A Case Study of the Limits of Dodd-
Frank Anti-Retaliation Protections and the Impact on Corporate Compliance Objectives, 51 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 151, 160 (2014) (quoting BAIRD WEBEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41350, THE DODD-
FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT: ISSUES AND SUMMARY, at 
summary (2010), available at http://www.llsdc.org/assets/DoddFrankdocs/crs-r41350.pdf) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 107. See id. at 159; Crash Course: The Origins of the Financial Crisis, supra note 104. 
 108. Wall Street Reform: The Dodd-Frank Act, THE WHITE HOUSE, https://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
economy/middle-class/dodd-frank-wall-street-reform (last visited Feb. 3, 2016), archived at http://per 
ma.cc/Y6CB-8PGQ.  
 109. Carozza, supra note 67 (noting parallels between the events leading to the financial crisis of 
2008 and Enron and WorldCom). Both involved “excessive risk-taking, massive market bubbles, and 
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of 2010 (“Dodd-Frank”), which was signed into law on July 21, 2010, by 
President Obama.
110
 At its root, the financial crisis of 2008 can be 
attributed to a lack of oversight and regulation of banks and mortgage 
companies.
111
 Therefore, the purpose of enacting Dodd-Frank, similar to 
the purpose of enacting SOX, was to “promote the financial stability of the 
United States by improving accountability and transparency in the 
financial system.”112 Dodd-Frank instituted “sweeping financial reform in 
the United States” and made significant changes to SOX.113 For example, 
Dodd-Frank expanded the limited coverage of whistleblower protection 
under SOX to a public company’s subsidiaries or affiliates.114 In addition, 
Dodd-Frank made the aforementioned procedural hurdles
115
 less 
challenging by giving whistleblowers 180 days to file a claim.
116
 Dodd-
Frank also added a right to a jury trial and made arbitration agreements 
unenforceable.
117
 These amendments specifically targeted and enhanced 
SOX’s whistleblower provisions—clearly illustrating Congress’s intent in 
making whistleblower protection more effective.
118
   
 
 
inadequate regulations to protect investors and consumers.” Id.  
 110. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (2014); Jessica Luhrs, Note, Encouraging Litigation: Why Dodd-Frank 
Goes Too Far in Eliminating the Procedural Difficulties in Sarbanes-Oxley, 8 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 
175, 175 (2012). 
 111. SOX, in theory, was supposed to prevent such a crisis by increasing oversight and internal 
control and supervision of public companies. See Wall Street Reform: The Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 
108. 
 112. See Murray v. UBS Sec., LLC, No. 12 Civ. 5914(KPF), 2014 WL 285093, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. 
Jan. 27, 2014) (citing Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat 1376 (2010)). 
 113. Megan Foscaldi, Recent Development, Whistleblower Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act, 31 
REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 486, 487 (2012); see also Dave Ebersole, Note, Blowing the Whistle on the 
Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Provisions, 6 OHIO ST. ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 123, 124 (2011); 
Luhrs, supra note 110, at 181 (noting that Dodd-Frank enlarged coverage to whistleblowers).  
 114. Foscaldi, supra note 113, at 489 (“By explicitly expanding the class of persons eligible for 
protection under the whistleblower provisions to include employees of subsidiaries and affiliates of 
public companies, the Dodd-Frank Act’s whistleblower provisions resolved a major loophole under 
which whistleblowers seeking protection under SOX were denied for not being ‘covered 
employees.’”).  
 115. See supra notes 94–97 and accompanying text.  
 116. Foscaldi, supra note 113, at 489 (giving whistleblowers double the amount of time to file a 
claim under Dodd-Frank as compared to under SOX).  
 117. Luhrs, supra note 110, at 180–81 (noting that Dodd-Frank “mark[ed] a significant departure 
from the original Sarbanes-Oxley rules”). 
 118. See infra Part VI.  
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C. Dodd-Frank’s Own Set of Problems 
Despite these amendments, Dodd-Frank is still criticized for over-
incentivizing whistleblowing
119
 and inadvertently minimizing the need for 
internal reporting.
120
 Each concern is briefly explained below. 
First, Dodd-Frank is criticized for encouraging whistleblowing. One of 
the biggest amendments to SOX is the addition of bounty provisions.
121
 
These bounty provisions incentivize employees with knowledge of 
corporate wrongdoing to report to the SEC in return for monetary 
rewards.
122
 This emphasis on incentives has raised concerns of frivolous 
claims and of employees reporting violations of corporate fraud out of 
pure greed.
123
  
Furthermore, by encouraging whistleblowers to report fraud to the 
SEC, Dodd-Frank inadvertently “decreases the effectiveness of 
compliance programs by reducing the number of employees willing to 
utilize internal reporting mechanisms.”124 In doing so, Dodd-Frank creates 
friction between corporations and the federal government as both entities 
compete for employee disclosures.
125
 In summary, through the use of 
bounty provisions, Dodd-Frank arguably undermines one of the many 
goals of SOX: to encourage employees to report violations of fraud 
internally within public companies.
126
   
 
 
 119. See infra note 122 and accompanying text.  
 120. See infra note 124 and accompanying text.  
 121. See Hartmann, supra note 94, at 1285 (quoting Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Beyond 
Protection: Invigorating Incentives for Sarbanes-Oxley Corporate and Securities Fraud 
Whistleblowers, 87 B.U. L. REV. 91, 113–14 (2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (noting that 
SOX did not provide any true incentive to blow the whistle and therefore only “sealed cracks in the 
doctrine” rather than offering “radical reform”).  
 122. CRAIN, KIM & SELMI, supra note 18, at 521–22.  
 123. See Hartmann, supra note 94, at 1313 (concerned with “creating a facet of society driven by 
green and the potential for quick wealth”). Compare Hartmann, supra note 94, at 1306 (discussing the 
possibility of frivolous claims), with Bishara et al., supra note 9, at 62 (noting that in 2012, the 
Commission had received 3001 whistleblower tips from all fifty states and that the program had 
proven to be valuable).  
 124. See Quigley, supra note 80, at 269. 
 125. Id. at 271 (discussing the tug-of-war notion between companies and the government).  
 126. See id. at 257. Contra Hartmann, supra note 94, at 1296 (noting that “the Dodd-Frank Act 
does not completely usurp Sarbanes-Oxley’s administrative process; rather, it creates an entirely new 
and separate enforcement mechanism for retaliation claims that parallels the existing regime under 
Sarbanes-Oxley”).  
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D. Lawson v. FMR LLC (2014) 
While Congress tried to improve the whistleblower protections 
provided in SOX through further legislation, the Supreme Court also tried 
to do so by providing lower courts with further guidance on the proper 
interpretation of SOX in Lawson v. FMR LLC.
127
 
In 2014, Lawson, an employee of a private company that contracted 
with FMR, sought protection under SOX after being retaliated against for 
raising concerns regarding the overstated expenses associated with 
operating mutual funds.
128
 Lawson is a great example of how the statutory 
language of SOX can give rise to different interpretations of who is 
protected under the law.
129
 In that case, the main issue was whether 
§ 1514A applies to employees of privately held contractors and 
subcontractors who perform work for a public company.
130
  
Justice Ginsburg, who delivered the opinion of the Court, stated that 
Congress, in structuring SOX, “recognized that outside professionals—
accountants, law firms, contractors, agents, and the like—were complicit 
in, if not integral to, the shareholder fraud and subsequent cover-up [of 
Enron].”131 She further stated that “outside professionals bear significant 
responsibility for reporting fraud by the public companies with whom they 
contract, and that fear of retaliation was the primary deterrent to such 
reporting by the employees of Enron’s contractors.”132 Outside 
professionals, in this sense, act as “gatekeepers” and are vital to spotting 
corporate fraud.
133
 By examining the congressional intent behind SOX, the 
 
 
 127. Lawson v. FMR LLC, 134 S. Ct. 1158, 1164 (2014). 
 128. Id.  
 129. See Spinner v. David Landau & Assocs., LLC, ARB Nos. 10-111, 10-115, ALJ No. 2010-
SOX-029, 2012 WL 1999677, at *8 (Dep’t of Labor May 31, 2012) (noting how “the statute’s lack of 
definition of ‘employee’ leaves the text open to competing problematic interpretations”); see also 
McCarthy, supra note 12, at 159 (noting that Congress, in its debate, did not examine this specific 
question, and that this lack of clarity is “likely a result of the haste with which SOX was passed”).  
 130. Lawson, 134 S. Ct. at 1161.  
 131. Id. at 1169; Spinner, 2012 WL 1999677, at *12–13; see also S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 4 
(2002); CRAIN, KIM & SELMI, supra note 18, at 509 (stating that the majority believed that 
professional obligations by accountants and lawyers to blow the whistle without any protection would 
be insufficient incentives to blow the whistle).  
 132. Lawson, 134 S. Ct. at 1170. In addressing the dissent’s concern, Ginsburg found supporters 
of the dissenting view had failed to identify a single case “in which the employee of a private 
contractor ha[d] asserted a § 1514A claim based on allegations unrelated to shareholder fraud.” Id. at 
1172. Furthermore, she noted that if the Court were somehow wrong in regards to interpreting the 
intent of Congress, then Congress could easily fix the problem by amending the statute. Id. at 1173. 
 133. See id. at 1170 (quoting S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 20–21 (2002)) (noting that a Senate report 
on the subject “emphasiz[ed] the importance of outside professionals as ‘gatekeepers who detect and 
deter fraud’”); S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 5 (2002) (giving two examples of whistleblower retaliation that 
involved outside professionals).  
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
1630 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 93:1613 
 
 
 
 
Court held that SOX worked to dismantle any incentive to remain silent in 
the corporate setting.
134
  
Although Lawson extends coverage to private contractors of public 
companies and Dodd-Frank expands the remedies available under SOX, 
neither addresses whether an employee discharging her duties is covered 
under SOX.
135
 However, both Lawson and Dodd-Frank support the 
argument that SOX be read broadly, in light of its purpose, to extend 
coverage to employees discharging their duties.
136
 
IV. EMERGING SPLIT AT THE DISTRICT COURT LEVEL 
In the past few years, three district court cases
137
 and one 
Administrative Review Board (“ARB”)138 decision have briefly addressed 
the issue of whether SOX covers employees discharging their duties. All 
four cases, discussed below, dispense with this issue rather quickly and 
instead turn their attention to the actual elements of the claim.
139
  
A. No Protection to Employees Discharging Their Duties  
In Riddle v. First Tennessee Bank, plaintiff-employee Riddle was 
terminated for what he believed constituted protected activity under 
Section 806 of SOX.
140
 Plaintiff alleged that he should be protected 
 
 
 134. Lawson, 134 S. Ct. at 1170; S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 20-21 (2002); see also Jennifer Farer, 
Who Is Protected by the Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Anti-Retaliation Provisions? 
The Supreme Court and SEC Weigh In, MCGUIREWOODS (Mar. 10, 2014), http://www.subjecttoin 
quiry.com/sec/who-is-protected-by-the-sarbanes-oxley-and-dodd-frank-whistleblower-anti-retaliation-
provisions-the-supreme-court-and-sec-weigh-in/, archived at https://perma.cc/EM4G-3CQT (stating 
that the Supreme Court favored a broader reading that extends to contractors because the text and 
structure of parallel statutes and the purpose of enacting SOX favored such an interpretation).  
 135. Although Congress has been silent on whether SOX extends coverage to employees 
discharging their duties, one cannot automatically interpret congressional intent from congressional 
silence. Also, the impact of discharging one’s duties on protection available for the employee from 
employer retaliation has been previously addressed under both Garcetti and the WPA. See supra Part 
I.  
 136. See infra Part VI.  
 137. Riddle v. First Tenn. Bank, No. 3:10-cv-0578, 2011 WL 4348298, at *1–2 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 
16, 2011); Barker v. UBS AG, 888 F. Supp. 2d 291, 302 (D. Conn 2012); Yang v. Navigators Grp., 
Inc., 18 F. Supp. 3d 519, 522 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
 138. Robinson v. Morgan Stanley, ARB No. 07-070, ALJ No. 2005-SOX-044, 2010 WL 348303, 
at *9 (Dep’t of Labor Jan. 10, 2010). 
 139. See Vodopia v. Koninklijke Philips Elecs., N.V., 398 F. App’x 659, 662 (2d. Cir. 2010) 
(holding that plaintiff must demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, four elements: “(1) that 
he engaged in protected activity, (2) the employer knew of the protected activity, (3) he suffered an 
unfavorable personnel action, and (4) circumstances exist to suggest that the protected activity was a 
contributing factor to the unfavorable action”). 
 140. Riddle, 2011 WL 4348298, at *1–2. 
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because he reported what he believed to be a violation of the Bank Bribery 
Act.
141
 Furthermore, he alleged that he continued to protest against his 
employer’s refusal to report the purported violation and carried out further 
investigations of his own.
142
 The court held that plaintiff’s actions did not 
constitute protected activity because he failed to “step outside his role” as 
an investigator.
143
 In this case, the court found that although plaintiff 
“threaten[ed] to step outside his role . . . he never d[id]. He merely 
report[ed] the alleged violation to three individuals within the company 
. . . while in his role as an investigator.”144  
After addressing this first issue, the court focused its analysis primarily 
on whether plaintiff reasonably believed that the violation he reported 
constituted protected activity under SOX.
145
 In order to constitute 
protected activity, “a plaintiff must prove that the cited conduct 
‘definitively and specifically’ relates to one of the classes of laws listed in 
[SOX].”146 Plaintiff, though alleging a violation of the Bank Bribery Act, 
failed to show that a reasonable person in his position would have found 
the purported violations to constitute shareholder fraud.
147
  
B. Protection to Employees Discharging Their Duties  
Unlike Riddle v. First Tennessee Bank, which did not provide 
protection for an employee discharging his duty, the ARB in Robinson v. 
Stanley concluded that “[SOX] does not indicate that an employee’s report 
or complaint about a potential violation must involve actions outside the 
complainant’s assigned duties.”148 The provisions of SOX merely state 
that no employer “may discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass, or in 
 
 
 141. Id. at *7 (noting, however, that the defendant alleged it fired plaintiff “for a string of 
performance failures and lack of judgment he routinely exhibited in conducting his investigations and 
his dealing with other employees”). 
 142. Id. at *3–4.  
 143. Id. at *7.  
 144. Id. at *8. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at *6 (quoting Welch v. Chao, 536 F.3d 269, 276–77 (4th Cir. 2008)) (holding that 
reasonable belief is enough to constitute protected activity as long as the reasonable belief is based 
specifically on one of the six categories of law that SOX provides protection for).  
 147. Id. at *9. Even if plaintiff Riddle had proven that his actions constituted protected activity, 
the court noted that defendant’s motion for summary judgment would still be granted because the 
defendant showed “by clear and convincing evidence it would have terminated Plaintiff regardless of 
his alleged protected activity.” Id.  
 148. Robinson v. Morgan Stanley, ARB No. 07-070, ALJ No. 2005-SOX-044, 2010 WL 348303, 
at *8 (Dep’t of Labor Jan. 10, 2010). 
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any other manner discriminate against an employee
149
 in the terms and 
conditions of employment.”150 The plain text of the statute does not 
distinguish types of employees covered under SOX. The ARB, therefore, 
saw no need to distinguish the plaintiff as a certain type of employee and 
instead turned its attention to determining whether Robinson had “directly 
implicate[d] the categories of fraud or securities violations listed in the 
statute,” and then focused on the causation element.151 The ARB held that 
Robinson failed to prove that “her protected activity was a contributing 
factor in the decision to discharge her” and dismissed her complaint.152 In 
the following four years, two district courts deferred to the ARB’s holding 
in Robinson.  
In 2012, the US District Court for the District of Connecticut extended 
coverage to an employee discharging his duty in Barker v. UBS AG, 
LLC.
153
 The court found the defendant’s reliance on Riddle unavailing and 
instead held that construing whistleblower protection broadly was 
reasonable in light of the purposes underlying SOX.
154
 
In 2014, the US District Court for the Southern District of New York, 
in Yang v. Navigators Group, Inc., held that SOX provided protection for 
plaintiff-employee Yang when she reported what she reasonably believed 
to be a securities law violation.
155
 Although the defendant argued that 
plaintiff Yang’s reports were “part and parcel of her job,” the court 
rejected this argument and instead focused on plaintiff Yang’s reasonable 
belief that a violation under SOX had occurred—based on her training and 
experience rather than her job duties.
156
 
The holdings in the latter three cases are premised on the idea that SOX 
was enacted to encourage the reporting of specific types of corporate 
fraud, regardless of an employee’s professional duty. These three cases 
demonstrate that not only is inquiring into an employee’s job duties 
 
 
 149. Contra 12 U.S.C. § 1790b(a)(1) (2014) (using the term “any” instead of “an” employee in its 
whistleblower statute). 
 150. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 1514A. 
 151. Robinson, 2010 WL 348303, at *1 (noting that in order for plaintiff to be successful in 
claiming whistleblower protection under SOX, a plaintiff must show that her actions constituted 
protected activity and that her actions were a contributing factor in the employer’s retaliation). 
 152. Id. 
 153. Barker v. UBS AG, 888 F. Supp. 2d 291, 302 (D. Conn. 2012).  
 154. Id. at 297; see also, e.g., Mahony v. KeySpan Corp., No. 04 CV 554 SJ, 2007 WL 805813, at 
*5 (E.D.N.Y Mar. 12, 2007) (“Given that SOX is a statute designed to promote corporate ethics by 
protecting whistleblowers from retaliation, it is reasonable to construe the statute broadly.”).  
 155. Yang v. Navigators Grp., Inc., 18 F. Supp. 3d 519, 522 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
 156. Id. at 530.  
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inconsequential, but also distracting—diverting the analysis away from the 
main purpose behind enacting SOX.  
V. ANALYSIS 
There is a social stigma associated with whistleblowing.
157
 Many 
perceive whistleblowers as reporting wrongdoing to benefit themselves or 
to harm others.
158
 This mentality can prevent the general public, including 
the legislature, from realizing society’s interest in promoting disclosures 
of wrongdoing within an organization.
159
 In their article, The Mouth of 
Truth, Norman D. Bishara, Elletta Sangrey Callahan, and Terry Morehead 
Dworkin point out that promoting whistleblowing has been ineffective due 
to “statutory characteristics, judicial interpretations, and the complex 
nature of the interaction among whistleblower claims.”160  
Each of the authors’ reasons why whistleblowing regulations have been 
ineffective are demonstrated in this Note. For instance, the ineffectiveness 
of whistleblowing is exemplified in SOX where the statutory language is 
unavailing,
161
 where there is a split in interpreting the coverage afforded 
by SOX to different types of employees among the courts,
162
 and where 
the purpose of enacting SOX is overshadowed by the unnecessary focus 
placed on an employee’s job responsibilities.163 In addition, judicial 
interpretation of employees discharging their duties under the WPA is 
“incompatible [overall] with the policies behind whistleblower protection 
statutes” and incompatible with SOX.164 In order to avoid these types of 
problems and to promote effective whistleblowing, it is paramount to 
observe the factors that motivate individuals to report violations,
165
 
 
 
 157. S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 19 (2002) (noting that companies punish whistleblowers because 
whistleblowing is seen as a disloyal act).  
 158. See generally Hartmann, supra note 94; Bishara et al., supra note 9, at 95 (associating 
derogatory terms such as “tattletales” or “snitches” with whistleblowers).  
 159. See Bishara et al., supra note 9, at 39 (stating that whistleblowing is as an “important source 
of information vital to honest government, the enforcement of laws, and the protection of the public 
health and safety”). 
 160. See Bishara et al., supra note 9, at 56.  
 161. See infra note 187 and accompanying text.  
 162. See supra Part IV. 
 163. See supra Part IV.B.  
 164. Modesitt, supra note 4, at 180.  
 165. See Bishara et al., supra note 9, at 60 (footnote omitted) (“Three key factors motivat[ing] 
[whistleblowers are]: confidence that the report would effectively address the misconduct at issue; 
belief that the organization supported whistleblowing, in general; and the seriousness of the 
malfeasance. Whistleblowers are also motivated by the desire to put ‘their’ organization back on the 
right track.”). 
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Congress’s purpose in enacting the statute,166 and other federal 
whistleblower statutes to help guide in the interpretation of the law.
167
 
To illustrate, in Lawson, the Supreme Court looked to the text and 
structure of the Aviation Investment and Reform Act (“Air 21”), a parallel 
statute, to better understand how to interpret SOX.
168
 This Subpart follows 
a similar approach by looking at the WPA, its case law, and Congress’s 
response in 2014.  
To review, the statutory language of the WPA protects any disclosure 
of information by an employee.
169
 However, under Willis and Huffman, the 
Federal Circuit held that the WPA does not extend coverage to employees 
merely carrying out their job responsibilities.
170
 In 2012, Congress 
amended the WPA and strengthened whistleblower protection to federal 
whistleblowers.
171
 Most notably, Congress added subsection (f), which 
does not exclude an employee from whistleblower protection simply 
because the report occurs during the normal course of her duties.
172
  
Prior to this amendment, most courts followed Garcetti, which 
scrutinized an employee’s job duties as an initial threshold requirement.173 
The Garcetti threshold, as noted by Julian W. Kleinbrodt,
174
 shifted the 
focus “from the content of the speech to the role of the speaker” and 
assumed that the government employer’s interest in workplace efficiency 
always outweighed an employee’s speech made pursuant to his job 
 
 
 166. See supra notes 70–74 and accompanying text.  
 167. See Bishara et al., supra note 9, at 83 (arguing that improving the harmony between 
whistleblowing laws has the potential to increase their effectiveness).  
 168. Lawson v. FMR LLC, 134 S. Ct. 1158, 1164 (2014). This tactic is necessary because 
Congress, when enacting SOX, “track[ed] . . . as closely as possible” the protections afforded by Air 
21’s whistleblower protection provision. Id. at 1175 (quoting S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 30 (2002) 
(“Because we had already extended whistleblower protections to non civil service employees, we 
thought it best to track those protections as closely as possible.”)). Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a) 
(2002) (“No [public] company . . . or any officer, employee, contractor, subcontractor, or agent of such 
company may discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass, or in any other manner discriminate 
against an employee in the terms and conditions of employment . . . .”), with 49 U.S.C. § 42121(a) 
(2002) (“No air carrier or contractor or subcontractor of an air carrier may discharge an employee or 
otherwise discriminate against an employee with respect to compensation, terms, conditions, or 
privileges of employment . . . .”).  
 169. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.  
 170. See supra Part I.C–D. 
  171. Jason Zuckerman, Congress Strengthens Whistleblower Protections for Federal Employees, 
LEL FLASH (Section on Labor & Emp’t, Am. Bar Ass’n, Chicago, IL), Nov./Dec. 2012 (noting that 
“President Obama signed into law the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012,” which 
amended and strengthened the whistleblower protection provided by the WPA). 
 172. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(f)(2) (2014) (stating that protection is not excluded simply because an 
employee’s disclosure is made during the normal course of her duties).  
 173. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.  
 174. Julian W. Kleinbrodt, Note, Pro-Whistleblower Reform in the Post-Garcetti Era, 112 MICH. 
L. REV. 111, 119 (2013).  
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duties.
175
 It is not surprising, then, that Garcetti, Willis, and Huffman did 
not extend protection to employees merely discharging their duties, as all 
three cases focused on protecting the employer, who wears two hats—
“employer and sovereign.”176  
However, by amending the WPA, Congress made “crystal clear its 
intent that any whistleblower who reports misconduct via one of the 
enumerated channels be protected under federal whistleblower statutes.”177 
This not only overruled the need to address whether a report concerning a 
potential violation arose out of an employee’s job responsibilities, but 
shifted the focus correctly back to the content of an employee’s speech.178 
Therefore, one argument for extending coverage to employees discharging 
their duties is that even its predecessor, the WPA, moved away from the 
Garcetti threshold and dispensed with this issue.  
Even if one does not find the first argument persuasive, courts should 
still hold that SOX extends coverage to employees discharging their duties 
because the ways in which SOX is distinguishable from general 
whistleblower statutes
179
 only augments the need for broader 
whistleblower protection.
180
 SOX is notably different because the concerns 
of an employer playing a dual role are not present as SOX protects 
employees of publicly traded companies.
181
 In addition, the purpose of 
SOX is hindered if courts interpreting SOX adopt the Garcetti approach to 
employees discharging their duties. The rest of this Note highlights these 
differences and states five arguments in favor of following the holding in 
Yang and extending coverage to employees discharging their duties.
182
 
VI. PROPOSAL 
Congress has the prerogative to fashion statutes as it sees fit.
183
 Section 
1514A begins by stating that SOX provides “[w]histleblower protection 
 
 
 175. Id.  
 176. Id. at 112.  
 177. Leshinsky v. Telvent GIT, S.A., 942 F. Supp. 2d 432, 449 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 178. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.  
 179. See generally CRAIN, KIM & SELMI, supra note 18, at 498–501 (noting that SOX and Dodd-
Frank are specific corporate whistleblower statutes that are unlike other general whistleblower statutes 
as they protect only certain types of employees for reporting certain types of information); see also 
Bishara et al., supra note 9, at 44 (discussing adjunct versus core statutes). 
 180. See, e.g., supra note 154 and accompanying text.  
 181. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 1514A. 
 182. All five of the arguments below derive from observing the history of whistleblower 
protection. Particularly, analyzing the WPA, Dodd-Frank, and Lawson in light of the purposes of 
enacting SOX supports extending coverage to employees discharging their duties. 
 183. See Morante-Navarro v. T&Y Pine Straw, Inc., 350 F.3d 1163, 1167 (11th Cir. 2003) (noting 
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for employees of publicly traded companies.”184 It continues to state that 
no employer “may discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass, or in any 
other manner discriminate against an employee in the terms and conditions 
of employment.”185 This is the full extent of the language used to clarify 
the type of employee protected under SOX.
186
 The statutory language of 
SOX alone is unavailing and does not help in defining the term 
“employee.”187 This vagueness has led to different interpretations of the 
same language by courts.
188
 However, these different interpretations do not 
automatically render SOX ambiguous.
189
 On the contrary, a careful 
examination of the policy reasons and objectives behind enacting SOX
190
 
supports five arguments for following the holding in Yang and extending 
coverage to employees discharging their duties.
191
  
First of all, SOX should extend coverage to employees discharging 
their duties because its predecessor, the WPA, moved away from 
distinguishing employees on this very basis when Congress amended 
subsection (f) of the WPA.
192
 The WPA is a great starting point because it 
is also a federal whistleblower statute that has struggled with this issue and 
can shed some light on how courts have dealt with and interpreted its 
whistleblower protection provisions.
193
  
 
 
the importance of giving deference to Congress’s intent).  
 184. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 1514A. 
 185. Id. Contra 12 U.S.C. § 1790b(a)(1) (2014) (using the term “any” instead of “an” employee in 
its whistleblower statute). 
 186. Spinner v. David Landau & Assocs., LLC, ARB Nos. 10-111, 10-115, ALJ No. 2010-SOX-
029, 2012 WL 1999677, at *15 (Dep’t of Labor May 31, 2012) (stating that “Congress could easily 
have limited [coverage] simply by statutorily defining the term ‘employee,’” but for some reason did 
not limit or restrict the term “employee”).  
 187. Contra Balko v. Ukrainian Nat’l Fed. Credit Union, No. 13 Civ. 1333(LAK)(AJP), 2014 WL 
1377580, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2014); 12 U.S.C. § 1790b(a)(1) (defining the scope of coverage 
by extending protection to all employees unless they “deliberately cause[d] or participate[d] in the 
alleged violation . . . or knowingly or recklessly provide[d] substantially false information”).  
 188. The Supreme Court has not addressed whether SOX extends coverage to employees 
discharging their duties. District court holdings are only persuasive and not mandatory. See, e.g., 
Englehart v. Career Educ. Corp., No. 8:14-cv-444-T-33EAJ, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64994, at *10, 
*20 (M.D. Fla. May 12, 2014) (noting that the Fifth Circuit declined to follow the conclusion of 
several district courts).  
 189. Id. at *20.  
 190. See S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 1 (2002) (Section I). The Senate Report is arguably one of the 
clearest expressions of Congress’s intent while drafting SOX.  
 191. Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 158 (1990) (finding it proper to fully understand the 
meaning of the statute by looking “not only to the particular statutory language, but to the design of the 
statute as a whole and to its object and policy”); see also Huffman v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 263 F.3d 
1341, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (holding that it was appropriate to “interpret the statute in light of its 
central purpose”).  
 192. See 5 U.S.C. § 2302(f)(2) (2014). 
 193. Huffman, 263 F.3d at 1351–52. Even though there seems to be a consistent notion of not 
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In both Willis and Huffman, the Federal Circuit declined to extend 
whistleblower protection to employees discharging their duties.
194
 One 
reason for this was a strong notion that an employee had a fiduciary 
obligation to his employer and that extending coverage to employees 
merely carrying out this obligation would interfere with “subjecting 
employees to normal, non-retaliatory discipline.”195 This notion was also 
embodied in Garcetti, which stated that an employer’s interest always 
outweighs the employee’s interest when the employee speaks pursuant to 
his or her job duties.
196
 By amending the WPA, however, Congress made 
its intent clear.
197
 Instead of focusing on the chance that employees would 
take advantage of whistleblower protection, Congress focused on the 
purpose of enacting the WPA, which was to protect federal whistleblowers 
from employer retaliation.
198
 Similarly, SOX should also move away from 
Garcetti and extend coverage to employees that are discharging their 
duties to fully enact the purpose Congress had in mind when drafting 
SOX—to prevent future corporate fraud by making public companies 
more transparent through the utilization of whistleblowers.  
Second, SOX is different from the WPA in a way that strengthens the 
argument for extending protection to employees discharging their 
duties.
199
 The WPA’s main goal is to “encourage reporting of a ‘genuine 
violation of law’ rather than ‘minor or inadvertent miscues occurring in 
the conscientious carrying out of a federal official or employee’s assigned 
duties.’”200 In contrast, SOX, though narrow in scope, is “intentionally 
 
 
extending coverage, the court here admits that its “jurisprudence on the normal duties question has not 
always been clear, and it is possible to find conflicting statements in dictum concerning the normal 
duties issue.” Id.  
 194. Willis v. Dep’t of Agric., 141 F.3d 1139, 1145 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Huffman, 263 F.3d at 1342. 
 195. Huffman, 263 F.3d at 1352. The court is concerned that extending coverage will cause 
employees to use whistleblowing as an escape route to avoid adverse action when they perform poorly 
in their normal work obligations. Id.  
 196. See Kleinbrodt, supra note 174, at 119.  
 197. Leshinsky v. Telvent GIT, S.A., 942 F. Supp. 2d 432, 449 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“In rejecting the 
Federal Circuit’s narrow reading of the WPA, Congress made crystal clear its intent that any 
whistleblower who reports misconduct via one of the enumerated channels be protected under federal 
whistleblower statutes.”). 
 198. Id.; see also Marques v. Fitzgerald, 99 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1996) (finding that there is “no 
significant policy served by extending whistle-blower protection only to those who carry a complaint 
beyond the institutional wall, [yet] denying it to the employee who seeks to improve operations from 
within the organization”). 
 199. CRAIN, KIM & SELMI, supra note 18, at 498 (noting that SOX is meant to protect only 
specific kinds of corporate fraud). 
 200. Langer v. Dep’t of the Treasury, 265 F.3d 1259, 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (quoting Herman v. 
Dep’t of Justice, 193 F.3d 1375, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 1999)); see also Huffman v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 
263 F.3d 1341, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (finding that reports outside of normal channels are disclosures 
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written to sweep broadly, protecting any employee of a publicly traded 
company who took such reasonable action to try to protect investors and 
the market.”201 The fundamental difference between the WPA and SOX 
lies in the consequences that stem from whistleblowing.
202
  
Stated differently, the magnitude of an unreported violation under SOX 
is greater than that of the WPA. As seen in Willis,
203
 the impact of 
reporting violations of conservation plans for sixteen farms did not lead to 
the collapse of the Department of Agriculture. In contrast, the impact a 
whistleblower can have by reporting securities fraud violations is drastic. 
This is not to say that reports of violations under the WPA are less 
important than SOX. Instead, violations under SOX are more time 
sensitive and require immediate attention and public exposure.
204
 If one of 
Enron’s employees had come forward with the extensive accounting 
improprieties to the public, the outcome could have potentially saved 
billions of dollars and prevented the collapse of Enron.
205
 The harmful and 
devastating impact that could occur from an unreported securities violation 
further supports a more liberal interpretation of the coverage extended to 
employees discharging their duties. The focus, therefore, needs to remain 
“on whether the employee reported conduct that he or she reasonably 
believes constituted a violation of federal law.”206  
Third, extending protection to employees discharging their duties is the 
most logical way to safeguard investors and the public from future 
 
 
protected under the WPA, but that reports of wrongdoing within the normal course of one’s duties are 
not protected).  
 201. 149 CONG. REC. S1725-01, S1725, 2003 WL 193278 (Jan. 29, 2003); see also Mahony v. 
KeySpan Corp., No. 04 CV 554 SJ, 2007 WL 805813, at *1, *5 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2007) (holding it 
reasonable to construe SOX broadly); Enron Whistleblower Tells of ‘Crooked Company,’ supra note 
84 (quoting former Enron managing director Vince Kaminski who “felt the company was threatened 
and . . . had a duty to speak up”).  
 202. Because SOX deals directly with publicly traded companies, the effect that a whistleblower 
can have on the financial markets is immeasurable. See S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 4 (2002) (pointing out 
that Enron was one example of numerous other cases where corporate fraud left the public in disarray).  
 203. Willis v. Dep’t of Agric., 141 F.3d 1139, 1139 (Fed. Cir. 1998).  
 204 Violations under SOX go more to timing and society’s imminent need to know about corporate 
fraud. See S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 3 (2002) (“Enron’s sudden collapse left thousands of investors 
holding virtually worthless stock . . . .”). 
 205. See S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 4 (2002). There is an undeniable need to protect those that report 
corporate fraud because of the particular vulnerability that corporate fraud places on the public. 
Firefighters and teachers, for example, have no way of being aware of the fraud occurring in these 
companies, and in turn have no means of protecting themselves from losing significant investments 
without the help of whistleblowers. See id.; see also supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
 206. Leshinsky v. Telvent GIT, S.A., 942 F. Supp. 2d 432, 443 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (quoting 
Sylvester v. Parexel Int’l LLC, ARB No. 07-123, ALJ Nos. 2007-SOX-039, 2007-SOX-042 (Dep’t of 
Labor May 25, 2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
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harm.
207
 In a committee hearing, experts warned Congress “that there are 
more ‘Enrons’ lurking out there, simply eluding discovery.”208 If Enron 
could hide massive amounts of debt from the public for four years,
209
 it is 
absurd to think that Enron’s employees, who are not hired as accountants 
or auditors, would be able to notice accounting irregularities that are so 
intricately designed and hidden.
210
 It is therefore essential to rely on 
whistleblowers
211
 from within the company who are hired as experts in 
accounting and auditing because they are in the best position to spot 
corporate fraud.
212
 If, however, employees discharging their duties are not 
protected, securities violations are likely to go unreported and 
undetected.
213
  
By declining to provide protection to employees discharging their 
duties, the statute is effectively rendered useless.
214
 SOX is already 
tailored narrowly and has failed to protect many whistleblowers due to its 
procedural and substantive hurdles.
215
 Further limiting the coverage 
provided to whistleblowers under SOX only undermines Congress’s 
 
 
 207. See S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 2-3 (2002) (stating that the public was not savvy to the inner 
workings of Enron as Enron and its auditors spun “an intricate spider’s web of deceit” that 
“successfully deceived the investing public and reaped millions for some select few insiders”). 
 208. Id. at 11.  
 209. Id. at 3. 
 210. Even when Enron’s former head of risk and research, Vince Kaminski, reported his concerns 
to upper management, he was not taken seriously. See Enron Whistleblower Tells of ‘Crooked 
Company,’ supra note 84 (describing how the defense attorney of Kenneth Lay, Enron’s CEO, 
questioned Kaminski’s competence on cross-examination and got him to acknowledge that he is not an 
accountant or an accounting expert). 
 211. See S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 10 (2002) (realizing that whistleblowers “are the only firsthand 
witnesses to the fraud” in complex fraud prosecutions). 
 212. Id. at 2. In its Senate Report, Congress stated that “[t]he alleged activity Enron used to 
mislead investors was not the work of novices.” Id. Therefore, it is crucial to rely on expert 
accountants and auditors that are hired from within the company to spot and report corporate fraud. 
See Bishara et al., supra note 9, at 37 (noting that the intent of whistleblowing is not to focus on 
whether an employee learned of fraud during the course of his duties, but rather the intent lies in 
exposing, curtailing, and deterring misconduct through self-reporting and self-monitoring). 
 213. See Bishara et al., supra note 9, at 60 (noting that employees were motivated to blow the 
whistle if they were confident that the report would be addressed and that the organization would 
support and protect the employees who reported such violations); see also S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 11 
(2002) (noting that “one in two Americans . . . depend on the transparency and integrity of our public 
markets”).  
 214. See Bishara et al., supra note 9, at 48–49 (stating that SOX was criticized for not providing 
enough protection for whistleblowers); see also Banick, supra note 1, at 1899 (arguing that it is 
“improbable that . . . an employee would encounter wrongdoing ‘outside the scope’ of his or her job as 
the duties explicitly entail monitoring and reporting such wrongdoing—which leaves the argument that 
any wrongdoing discovered is always within the scope of his or her duties”).  
 215. See Bishara et al., supra note 9, at 48–49; Moberly, supra note 9, at 100–03.  
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intent.
216
 In fact, a major component of SOX focuses on internal 
reporting,
217
 which cannot be enforced if employees can only seek 
protection by stepping outside their role and reporting to external 
sources.
218
  
Fourth, coverage should extend to employees discharging their duties 
because Dodd-Frank supports such a reading. As a matter of fact, most of 
the amendments to Dodd-Frank evince Congress’s intent to broaden 
whistleblower protection under SOX. For example, Congress expanded 
protection by explicitly including a public company’s subsidiaries and 
affiliates.
219
 Congress also addressed the procedural hurdles in SOX by 
doubling the amount of time whistleblowers had to bring a claim.
220
 
Furthermore, Dodd-Frank prevents employers from upholding pre-dispute 
arbitration agreements and grants whistleblowers a right to trial by jury.
221
 
The overall intent of Congress is to broaden whistleblower protection, 
which, in this case, is best furthered by following the holding in Yang and 
extending protection to employees discharging their duties.  
Last but not least, SOX should extend coverage to employees 
discharging their duties because Lawson extended coverage to private 
contractors of the public company.
222
 One reason why the Supreme Court 
extended coverage to private contractors is that securities violations 
occurred despite oversight from third-party advisory firms.
223
 By 
extending coverage, the Court’s goal was to ensure protection of private 
contractors that blew the whistle. If auditors and lawyers further removed 
from the company are protected under SOX, it only makes sense to protect 
auditors and lawyers of the public company. The Supreme Court realized 
that extending protection to private contractors was the best means for 
carrying out the intent Congress had when it enacted SOX. In a similar 
manner, in order to prevent future corporate scandals, it is in the courts’ 
 
 
 216. Lawson v. FMR LLC, 134 S. Ct. 1158, 1169–71 (2014) (stating the Congressional intent 
behind enacting SOX). 
 217. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 §§ 401–409. 
 218. See Kleinbrodt, supra note 174, at 126 (“One of Garcetti’s major deficiencies is that it 
incentivizes employees to publicly voice their concerns before they utilize internal channels of 
communication.”); see also Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 427 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(stating similar reasoning).  
 219. See supra note 114 and accompanying text. 
 220. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.  
 221. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.  
 222. See generally Lawson v. FMR LLC, 134 S. Ct. 1158 (2014). 
 223. See McCarthy, supra note 12, at 144 (“One troubling aspect of these scandals was that they 
occurred despite oversight from the corporations themselves and from outside advisers such as law 
firms, accounting firms, and other contractors.”).  
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best interest to uphold the line of reasoning in Yang and extend coverage 
to public employees that are discharging their duties.  
CONCLUSION 
There are many reasons why SOX can be criticized as a failing law.
224
 
However, it is important to keep in mind that SOX was the first 
whistleblower statute that provided protection to employees of public 
companies.
225
 Although this does not excuse the haste with which the bill 
was drafted, nor its consequent deficiencies, it does show that SOX was a 
direct response to a scandal that devastated the financial markets.
226
 
Congress, when drafting the bill, had a single purpose: to protect investors 
against corporate fraud through increased transparency, accountability, 
and whistleblower protection.
227
 With this purpose in mind, every court 
should follow the Yang decision and extend protection under SOX to 
employees discharging their duties. History, both before and after SOX, 
validates this argument and compels the courts to shift their focus when 
interpreting the scope of SOX. There have been debates over who is 
covered under SOX and whether employees discharging their duties 
should be protected.
228
 Instead of asking who is covered under SOX, the 
analysis should focus on what is covered under SOX and why. By 
focusing on the latter two questions, the need to ask who is covered is 
eliminated, and the focus properly shifts back to preventing corporate 
fraud through the integral role of whistleblowers in publicly traded 
companies. 
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 224. See generally Brite, supra note 73. 
 225. S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 19 (2002). 
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